How to stop a cottonwood tree from producing cotton

How to Get Rid of Cottonwood Fluff | Home Guides

By wsmithleaf Updated July 24, 2020

Cottonwood fluff comes from the cottonwood tree, one of North America's fast-growing trees. They are a member of the Populus genus. The most famous species is the eastern cottonwood (Populous deltoids). According to the United States Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service, they are hardy in zones 2 to 9.

What Is Cottonwood Fluff?

The floating cottonwood fluff is a signature of the cottonwood tree. The parachute-like white fluff from trees is just fruit capsules with seeds of the cottonwood tree. Cottonwood trees normally shed their leaves in fall when the temperature drops below 45 to 50 degrees Fahrenheit. Fluff can annoyingly cover your entire yard and driveway for up to two whole weeks after it begins to detach from the tree.

If your house is near cottonwood trees, fluff will likely cover your driveway, lawn and just about anything else that’s on the ground once the tree begins to shed its seeds. The overwhelming amount of seeds can be truly invasive, and it can look like a snowstorm has hit you.

The excess seeds can contribute to allergies, causing much discomfort. Aside from the seeds being a nuisance, they can also be a hazard in certain circumstances since the cottonwood fluff is flammable.

Getting Rid of Cottonwood Fluff in the Air

The first option for getting rid of cottonwood fluff is spraying the tree leaves with a fruit eliminator, which will help control the release of the seeds. The key is to apply the solution well enough to cover the leaves and branches of the tree but be careful not to overapply it.

Essentially, the liquid should have a thick coating but should not cause excess dripping all over the tree and ground. Once applied, the chemical will help to greatly reduce the amount of seeds that are released during its reproduction cycle. With the use of a fruit eliminator, you will notice a huge difference between your chemically treated trees and untreated trees.

Cottonwood trees can grow quite large. In fact, the Zealand Tree Register says that the largest cottonwood tree recorded is in Hastings, New Zealand and is 42 meters high. You may need help to reach higher areas of the tree, so a ladder can help do the trick. If for any reason you are unable to spray the tree yourself, it is recommended that you hire a professional.

Reducing Cottonwood Fluff With an Herbicide

Cottonwood trees produce seeds just like cotton, and cottonwood seeds will fall when they are fully grown. This usually occurs in late April or early May, and the shedding cycle is finished no later than June or July.

Usually, cottonwood trees produce their signature fluff every year after they mature. However, they don’t drop cotton every year. They normally drop cotton one year and do not do so the next year. It is said that they preserve their resources in the meantime. Cottonwood fluff is produced with some fringy cotton fibers covering the cottonwood seed. If you can get rid of the seeds, you can also get rid of the cottonwood fluff.

You can reduce cottonwood fluff by making a cottonwood tree seedless through annual treatment with an ethephon-based herbicide, says Cooperative Extension Service. These herbicides are growth inhibiting, and they will prevent the seeds from forming. Getting a head start on treating your cottonwood tree with a growth hormone early in the spring is best. If you’ve noticed a young cottonwood tree on your property without seeds, it may take years for it to mature.


  • United States Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service: Populus deltoides W. Bartram ex Marshall
  • The New Zealand Tree Register: Tree Information
  • Cooperative Extension Service: Injecting Female Cotton Tree With Regular Home Products


  • Apply the ethephon-based herbicide within four hours of mixing.
  • Do not save unused diluted ethephon-based herbicide.
  • Do not apply fertilizer two weeks before or after treatment.
  • Hire professionals to remove the tree if maintenance is not worth the time and money.


  • Wear gloves when handing herbicides.

Writer Bio

Midwest native, nature lover, and coffee fanatic.

Research Findings on Chemical Control of Cottonwood | CropWatch

Cottonwood (Populus tremula) is a common tree species across the Midwest. Near rivers, streams and lakes it provides many benefits such as stabilizing river banks and providing wildlife habitat; however, cottonwood also can be considered an invasive species (i.e., weed), as it is characterized by vigorous colonization of areas. Sub-irrigated meadows are one of those areas where cottonwood acts as a weed and reduces the quality of grassland (Figure 1).

Due to a lack of information on the effectiveness of herbicides for cottonwood control, a study was conducted in 2016 and 2017 to test eight herbicides:

  • 2,4-D amine (64 oz/acre),
  • Ally XP® (metsulfuron methyl [2 oz/acre]),
  • Grazon P+D® (picloram + 2,4-D amine [4 pts/acre]),
  • Clarity® (dicamba [32 oz/acre]),
  • Telar®/Glean® (chlorsulfuron [2 oz/acre]),
  • Cimmaron Max® (metsulfuron methyl + dicamba + 2,4-D amine [4 pts/acre]),
  • Picloram 22k® (picloram [3 pts/acre]), and
  • Stinger® (clopyralid [1 pt/acre]).

Trees were sprayed at full foliage (early June). Tree size ranged from 1 to 5 feet.

Cimmaron Max®, Grazon P+D®, and Picloram 22k® provided excellent (100%) control that lasted for more than one year (Table 1). Ally XP® and 2,4-D amine provided fair control (70-76%), while Clarity®, Telar®/Glean® and Stinger® provided very poor (20-33%) control of cottonwood throughout the observation period.

Effective control of cottonwood by picloram-based products (Picloram, Tordon, and Grazon P+D) is not surprising, as picloram is generally known to be effective on woody plants. Despite its effectiveness on cottonwood, we do not recommend using picloram in sub-irrigated meadows as picloram tends to leach through the soil profile and potentially could contaminate high water tables. In fact, the labels for picloram-based products clearly indicate that use should be avoided on soils that are very permeable (textures of sandy loam to sand) throughout the entire profile and which also have an underlying shallow aquifer such as a sub-irrigated meadow.  

Table 1: Herbicide efficacy for control of cottonwood
HerbicideRate / acre% Control
51 DATa
% Control
111 DAT
% Control
463 DAT
2,4-D amine 64 oz 73 70 76
Ally XP 2 oz 80 60 70
Grazon P+DB 4 pts 100 100 100
Clarity 32 oz 33 20 33
Telar/Glean 2 oz 43 27 36
Cimmaron Max 4 pts + 1 oz  100 100 100
Picloram 22kb 3 pts 100 100 100
Stinger 1 pt 27 20 30
a Days after treatment
B Note: Do not use Picloram 22K or Grazon P+D on pastures with a high water table.

It’s important to know the depth of the water table beneath your pasture before using any picloram-based product. In pastures with a higher water table, Cimmaron Max should be used instead.

Metsulfuron-methyl (Ally XP) applied alone provided fair control of cottonwood, however, excellent control was achieved when it was mixed with 2,4-D and dicamba (Cimmaron Max). Metsulfuron-methyl is a systemic herbicide with residual activity, known to be effective for controlling perennial species with underground stems or suckers, such as cottonwood. Effective control of the suckers will prevent regrowth of a sprayed cottonwood. Metsulfuron-methyl based products are also safe on grasses.

These results indicate there are few excellent herbicide options for cottonwood control in Nebraska pastures, for both sub-irrigated meadows and higher grounds.

Noiseless "Poplar". Unique ballistic missiles retire

August 6, 2021, 15:00


Topol-M ballistic system

© REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

Western SS-27 Sickle ("Sickle") - a masterpiece of academician Alexander Nadiradze - in 2024 will be completely withdrawn from service with the Russian Federation. From the point of view of the concept laid down by the team of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT), design ideas and real capabilities, Topol launched the country's absolute technological dominance in the field of nuclear missile deterrence.

Only 36 years have passed since they took up combat duty - for a man the age of maturity, for a rocket - old age. If in 1999 we had 360 launchers of such vehicles in ten missile divisions across the country, today there are only 45 left in two.

Open Secret

"Topol" was created in perestroika times, when Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Donald Reagan (USA) headed for detente and for the first time in many years started talking about reducing strategic offensive weapons. Starting 19In the 1990s, the arsenal of mutual destruction was monstrous: we have 2,500 nuclear weapons carriers and 10,271 warheads for them, while the Americans have 2,222 missiles and 10,371 warheads for them. This stock was guaranteed to be enough to destroy the planet several times. Awareness of the enormity of the situation and economic expediency took over - a period of detente began. How they cut the arsenal is a separate conversation. The result is known - for example, according to the START-3 treaty extended by Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin, the parties each have 700 launchers and 1,550 nuclear charges.

Read also

The Strategic Missile Forces in 2024 will stop operating the Topol intercontinental ballistic missile only the quantity, not the quality of weapons. As a result, the arms race, on the one hand, sort of stopped, and on the other hand, it reached a completely different technological level.

Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor, former head of the 4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, dealing with the development of nuclear weapons, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin says that the Topol complex was a response to the ever-increasing accuracy of American sea- and silo-based ballistic missiles hitting the target . Early 19In the 1980s, the Soviet military understood that if this trend continued, it would not be possible to strike a balance. Within the framework of the same disarmament agreements with Washington, we not only exchanged the coordinates of missile silos, but also began to provide information on the characteristics of missile systems that are in service or are just being created. This predetermined the decision to create a mobile launcher that can quickly change positions, which will increase the difficulty of tracking it, which means it will increase the chances of remaining unscathed. Which is completely justified.

RS-12M intercontinental ballistic missile (under the START treaty), during a parade on Red Square, 1990

© Vasily Egorov, Vladimir Musaelyan/TASS Yuri Solomonov) and he took out a black-and-white photograph of A4 format depicting the top-secret RT-2PM complex at that time. A semi-axle tractor, in the back of which a container with a ballistic missile was located, was photographed from the side, and a measuring ruler stood next to it.

— What is this? I asked the designer.

Poplar, he replied. And then he said that he could not give the picture for publication in the newspaper. It was made specifically for the Americans, and if I want to get it, then I have to contact the State Department. It turns out that, under a bilateral agreement, the transfer of information about one's own strategic forces to a third party (even if they are journalists of one's own state) is prohibited. Today, however, all these photos are openly on the Internet.

The qualities of the "Topol" made it possible to say with confidence that in the event of a nuclear war, the group of missiles would not only survive, but would become a means of retaliatory strike. The fact is that even in the presence of reconnaissance satellites, it is almost impossible to track the movement of installations - cars crawl through forests and swamps faster than satellite images arrive, which makes firing at these places pointless. At the same time, Topol missiles can be launched wherever they are, even from the hangars in which they stand at normal times (for this, a sliding roof is made near the buildings for storing combat vehicles).

Read also

Russia successfully launched the latest ICBM from Plesetsk

For 36 years, the Americans have not been able to respond to the Soviet development with any of their mobile counterparts. At one time they tried to build a strategic railway complex, but quickly abandoned this idea. In the United States, railways are private, even the state and the army have to pay for travel on them, and their network is not so extensive as to imperceptibly move nuclear trains along it. There was an idea to hide it underground, but the covers of the mines through which the train would launch missiles would have clear coordinates, which made the existence of an underground missile carrier meaningless. In this regard, the USSR turned out to be a leader - we created both the Molodets railway complex and mobile Topols.

Dry charge

One of the achievements of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering in the creation of the Topol complex is that it is a solid propellant rocket. Unlike its liquid counterparts, which were mainly in service with the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), it is simpler and safer to operate. So, almost all the liquid vehicles on combat duty were without fuel - the slightest mistake in the combat crew could lead to the strait and, as a result, to the death of the participants in the rocket refueling.

But the solid-propellant rocket is initially fueled and ready for action. In the 1990s, MIT even invited journalists to the show "Burn Topol" to confirm the safety of equipment operation. The complex was literally doused with fire, but nothing happened to the rocket - it was even fired later as part of tests from the Plesetsk training ground.

However, solid-propellant missiles also had drawbacks - in terms of energy characteristics they lost to liquid vehicles; with the same mass and flight range, they carried a lower combat load. "Topol" - a monoblock missile with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 500-800 kt. The same liquid-propellant RS-18 "Stiletto" The design of Vladimir Chelomey is equipped with six individually targetable nuclear warheads with a total capacity of 3300 kt. With the RS-20 "Satan" (or, as it is called the modernized version, "Voevoda") of Vladimir Utkin, it is generally pointless to compare - the missile is capable of throwing from 15 medium or up to ten heavy nuclear warheads with a yield of 550 kt each, enough to wipe out a city the size of New York or even the whole country.

Read also

Why rocket technologies are used to create transport of the future

In addition, unlike liquid rockets, solid rockets really age. More precisely, their fuel is aging, losing, like a person, their physical, energy and other qualities. And the same "Stiletto" after more than 30 years of service is still in service. So, for $50 million of "gas" debts, we bought 30 stages for the RS-18 from Ukraine, which had been stored in a warehouse for about 20 years. Empty, they will retain their characteristics, and after a small technical examination and refueling, they will be "ready for battle." Thanks to this feature, a complex with a hypersonic maneuvering nuclear warhead "Avangard" is being put into service today, and "Topol" is easier to write off, replacing it with completely new missiles.

An apple from an apple tree

Yury Solomonov, chief designer and head of MIT, was well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the Topol rocket. Therefore, in the noughties, he proposed its modernization - Topol-M. Compared to its predecessor, it has "grown" and "plumped" - the length of the Topol-M, together with the warhead, was 22.7 m, while that of its predecessor was 21.5 m; the hull diameter of the next generation is 1.95 m (for the Topol - 1.80 m). The starting weight has also increased from 45.1 tons to 47.2 tons for the Topol-M; and the cast weight from 1 ton for the prototype up to 1200 kg for the upgraded version.The launch range is now more than 10 thousand km.The exact yield of the nuclear charge is not known, but according to some reports it can be judged that it is included in the megaton class (I remind you that Topol has it from 500 to 800 ct) In connection with such an upgrade, the tractor on which the rocket is transported received another leading - the eighth - axle. 0003

Ballistic complex "Topol-M"

© Artem Korotaev/TASS

The success of the program to create "Topol" and "Topol-M" allowed Solomonov to rise to a new level - the creation of sea ballistic missiles. Borey-class missile submarines 955 are now the backbone of the Russian naval component of the nuclear deterrence force. They are armed with a solid-propellant three-stage multi-block rocket RS-30 Bulava. Currently, the Russian Navy already has four such ships. And at the Severodvinsk machine-building enterprise "Sevmash" boats of the updated project 9 are in varying degrees of readiness55A "Borey-A": "Prince Oleg", "Generalissimo Suvorov", "Emperor Alexander III" and "Prince Pozharsky". They are expected to be built and handed over to the Navy by 2024.

It was expected that "Bulava", as Yuri Solomonov once said, would become a real breakthrough in the field of creating systems of strategic deterrence of the enemy; that it will be multi-platform: on submarines, land and air. And I must say that Borey has already proved this.

Read also

Farewell to "Red October". Why they want to scrap the most powerful submarine

As for the new Yars mobile missile system, it is the basis of silo and mobile nuclear deterrence systems - a hybrid of Topol, Topol-M and naval Bulava. Under the START-2 treaty, we did not have the right to create a multi-unit missile system for re-equipping strategic missile units, so mobile and silo missiles received one nuclear warhead each. According to some reports, Solomonov managed to integrate the third stage of the marine machine with the first two from the land-based Topol-M. As a result, multi-block vehicles were obtained, which are much less required, but they are much more useful in the event of hostilities, because the Yars carries several warheads. At present, according to the website "Strategic Nuclear Weapons of Russia", there are already 135 Yars mobile complexes on guard of the Russian Federation, which is a third of the entire land group of the Strategic Missile Forces - 540 of the possible 1550 nuclear warheads allowed to us by START-3.

Cold Legacy

On the basis of "Poplar" was also created a complex for automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike "Perimeter" (in the West it is called Dead Hand - "Dead Hand"). Its peculiarity is that if, as a result of an attack, Russia loses political leadership, then artificial intelligence will step in. He will independently decide on a retaliatory nuclear strike. That is, the same Topols will automatically take off in the Far East and the European part of the country and, passing over Russian territory, will give a signal to launch the missiles that survived the enemy strike.

Last year, a similar scenario was worked out during the audit of the management of strategic nuclear forces. The Project 955 nuclear missile cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" for the first time in history fired Bulava ballistic missiles from the Sea of ​​Okhotsk at the Chizha test site near Arkhangelsk. Two more vehicles - the naval "Sineva" from the Barents Sea and the land "Yars" from the Plesetsk training ground - hit a target field in Kamchatka.

Deputy Director of the Institute for the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, former head of the information and analytical center of the Ministry of Defense, retired Major General Pavel Zolotarev then expressed the opinion that the past exercises of strategic nuclear forces were connected with checking the operation of the automatic control system of strategic nuclear forces "Perimeter". Moreover, President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex after these events, announced the creation in Russia of "a new control center with almost absolute protection, including strategic nuclear forces." In addition, the head of state spoke about a significant expansion of the analytical and operational capabilities of strategic nuclear forces control systems.

The opinion of the editors may not coincide with the opinion of the author. Quoting is permitted with reference to

Declaration of half hints: whom and for what Russia is ready to bombard with nuclear missiles

  • Pavel Aksenov
  • BBC Russian Service

”Context”: it will help you understand the events.

Photo by Minoborony RF/TASS

"Fundamentals of the state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence", which Vladimir Putin signed on June 2, is essentially a new Russian nuclear doctrine. This is the first such document that was published in Russia or the USSR. The BBC Russian service explains the meaning of Russia's nuclear doctrine.

Until this week, the mechanism and principles of decision-making in the development and use of nuclear weapons were a state secret.

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This gave rise to conjectures and interpretations, not only in the press, but also among the military. Now such a document has been published, it has clarified a lot, but even now experts find provisions in it that can be interpreted very broadly.

What is nuclear deterrence?

The document answers two questions: what does Russia want to achieve with nuclear deterrence and in what case can it use nuclear weapons.

In other words, the document contains a list of what needs to be done to get Russia to aim its nuclear missiles at you, and what to do in order for it to launch them.

One of the main qualities of nuclear weapons is that they do not need to be used. It provides security not by its use, but by the threat itself, by the possibility of using it. This is "nuclear deterrence" - the principle that underlies strategic stability.

And "strategic stability", in turn, is the state in which the world has been for many decades - the absence of open military conflicts between the world's largest states.

We are talking about countries that have weapons that can destroy the entire civilization. Therefore, strategic stability concerns literally everyone.

The nature of this stability is changing, as the factors that ensure it change - new types of weapons and new technologies appear, treaties are concluded and terminated, international terrorism is activated, new countries receive nuclear weapons.

And, since the Russian document concerns one of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, it will certainly also have an impact on strategic stability.

What does Russia consider a threat?

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Doctrine says Russia needs a nuclear deterrent to counter certain threats.

Among them there are threats, which also include nuclear weapons - the possession of a certain state of its own or the deployment of someone else's on its territory - which can be used against Russia.

Other paragraphs either do not mention nuclear weapons at all, or do so very vaguely.

For example, a threat is considered to be the build-up of conventional army groupings in adjacent territories, which include nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. But after all, a ballistic missile, not necessarily equipped with a nuclear warhead, can be considered a delivery vehicle.

Other threats - deployment of anti-missile defense systems, intermediate and short-range cruise and ballistic missiles, high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, attack unmanned aerial vehicles, directed energy weapons, deployment of weapons in space.

This provision was introduced into the doctrine after various countries began to actively develop strategic non-nuclear weapons.

  • "No one listened to us. Listen now": Putin showed a new nuclear weapon

Russia also invests manpower and resources in such weapons - the Kinzhal hypersonic aviation missile, the Avangard glide block, the Peresvet laser complex.

Under what conditions can Russia use nuclear weapons?

The second important part of the doctrine is a list of scenarios in which Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, that is, to go beyond nuclear deterrence.

There are four such scenarios:

  • receiving reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking Russia;
  • use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against Russia;
  • some impact on objects, the failure of which will lead to the disruption of the response of nuclear forces;
  • aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.

There are also very vague wordings here. For example, ballistic missiles can be anything - nuclear or non-nuclear, intercontinental or medium-range.

The impact of the enemy on critical objects is also not defined in any way - the object can be blown up, or it can be disabled by a hacker attack.

Nevertheless, all this can lead to a nuclear strike.

These formulations, which can be interpreted very broadly, according to Konstantin Bogdanov, a Russian expert and senior researcher at the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, appeared in the document on purpose.

"It shows an attempt by the military-political leadership to leave itself maximum freedom of maneuver in very specific moments related to the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons," he believes.

According to Bogdanov, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons was deliberately "shaded" in the document.

"This is an element of the national nuclear strategy, which is called "deterrence through uncertainty". This is a deliberate application so that the opponent does not calculate in the event of a serious conflict ... roughly speaking, he did not optimize the pressure, realizing that he would not be hit with nuclear weapons up to here weapons," the expert said.

Bogdanov admits that such a game is quite risky, since the enemy may make a mistake, believing that he has not yet crossed the "red line", while the Russian military will already give the order for a nuclear strike.

Why is the doctrine being criticized in the West?

Another provision of the doctrine, which may be noticed in the West, is contained in the part that speaks of the goals of nuclear deterrence.

The fourth paragraph of the document states: "The state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence [...] guarantees [...] in the event of a military conflict - the prevention of an escalation of hostilities and their termination at acceptable levels for the Russian Federation and (or) its allies conditions".

The term "escalation" is a reminder that in the West, Russia's nuclear strategy is often referred to as Escalate To De-Escalate.

This refers to the principle of using nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear threat, previously spelled out in the doctrine. Russia really allows itself to use nuclear weapons in response to an enemy attack without it.

This principle is perceived in the West as the desire of the Russian leadership to reduce the threat of war against Russia by retaliating by the threat of turning a conventional conflict into a nuclear one.

Figuratively speaking, Russia is accused of threatening a potential adversary with an overreaction - a pistol in response to a knife, so that the enemy surrenders and retreats.

However, this wording is also rather vague in the current document. RIAC expert Ilya Kramnik believes that there are no grounds to suspect Russia of "escalation for the sake of de-escalation".

"To say that nuclear weapons can be used as a means of de-escalating the conflict, in my opinion, is irresponsible, because the fundamentals themselves, and this has been said more than once in the text, are aimed at preventing the use of nuclear weapons ", he told the BBC.

Kramnik believes that in this part the authors of the Doctrine simply once again formulated the principle of nuclear deterrence, and did not hint at some special strategy.

However, in another part of the document, the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons is openly spelled out - in the event of "aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened."

When can Russia launch nuclear missiles?

Alexander Yermakov of the Russian International Affairs Council notes that the current doctrine declares a very important principle - a clear and precise indication that Russia, in the event of a nuclear attack, will respond with a retaliatory strike. That is, the decision on a retaliatory strike will be made not after an atomic explosion on its territory, but not preventively either, but only after the launch of enemy missiles.

The USSR did indeed declare the principle of not delivering a nuclear strike first. Russia subsequently did not clearly discuss this principle.

On the one hand, she did not declare her refusal to carry out a preventive attack. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin, in his famous speech that in a nuclear war the Russians "will go to heaven as martyrs, and they [opponents] will simply die," announced publicly that Moscow precisely shares the principle of a retaliatory strike, when the decision about it is accepted after receiving information about a missile attack on Russia.

Such a scenario almost led to a nuclear war between the USSR and the USA in 1983, when, as a result of a computer failure, the system signaled a missile attack, and only duty officer Stanislav Petrov saved the world from nuclear war by refusing to trust the equipment.

Alexander Ermakov believes that the current system of early warning systems in Russia takes into account such errors: "These are all declarations, that is, what is announced. What is written in the instructions of officials at the facilities ... It is not at all necessary that all this be written there."

Why do we need a doctrine at all?

The appearance of such a document, according to experts, is already a big event that will have a positive impact on stability.

"There has never been such a document," says Konstantin Bogdanov. "The Americans regularly update their nuclear doctrine, Nuclear posture review, and Russia has never even come close to having such a document."

"All we have on nuclear doctrine is two paragraphs in military doctrine and a huge amount of speculation related to official publications and statements by high-ranking leaders," says Bogdanov.

"Now we, at least, have a certain framework, which is signed by the head of state and which is a kind of offer to the world community - we behave like this, - the expert argues. - Institutionalization is a kind of nuclear weapon."

Ilya Kramnik agrees with him: “Still, talking is better than fighting. When major military powers know more about each other’s intentions, this reduces the field of uncertainty, the field of speculation, in which various dangers and threats can grow. having information about plans, intentions and likely patterns of reactions to certain threats makes life easier."

According to Bogdanov, despite the general vagueness of the wording, many of his provisions clarify Russian military policy in various areas.

He called such a provision the assertion of a nuclear strike in response to the launch of certain missiles without specifying their class: “This is a very clear signal about how Russia sees military risk management in regional issues. In the issue of medium-range missiles. This is a very clear signal , which was spelled out at the doctrinal level. Not a statement that we were offended, but that we are changing our planning in this way.

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